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Introduction
Civil armed confl icts are nasty, brutish, peculiarly 
intractable and, these days, often long, even where 
one side is vastly stronger than the other. In earlier 
times, power asymmetries translated more readily 
into slavish submission, expulsion or extermina-
tion of the weaker party. Today, the universalization 
of human rights as a kind of secular faith and a 
spreading (albeit by no means universal) conviction 
that gross violence within a country threatens the 
interests of other countries combine to inhibit that 
translation. But it may nevertheless occur. Ask the 
Tutsis of Rwanda, that is to say, ask the remnant 
who survived.
 Normative restraints on the exterminating use 
of force rise amidst a necropolis of losers. The 
dead are thereby honored, but just as dead. If they 
are susceptible to comfort, then comfort they may 
have in the thought that their unintended sacrifi ce 
inspired the struggle to limit the play of ruthless 
power.
 Today the structure of constraining rules and 
principles is largely complete. It bans, admittedly 
with somewhat varying degrees of clarity, brute 
repression as a means for resolving group confl ict. 
The great remaining task, far more arduous than 
norm-building, is enforcement. Over the decade, 
regional organizations and the United Nations, as 
well as ad hoc coalitions and individual states, have 
episodically tried to narrow the gap between norms 
and behavior by threatening or employing military 
and economic sanctions against pitiless govern-
ments and factions.
 During the past decade, champions of a norma-
tive order informed by commitment to protect the 
weak and foment peaceful settlement have begun to 
invest hope in another enforcement vehicle, namely 
criminal punishment of those who lead or serve 
delinquent forces. Its threat, were it to appear real, 
could affect the behavior of the agents of civil con-
fl ict regardless of whether greed or grievance drive 
them. The current extradition battle over Augusto 
Pinochet, the long-time Chilean dictator, and the 
recent treaty establishing a permanent International 
Criminal Court are milestones in the accelerating 
effort to add penal sanctions to the humanitarians’ 
armory. My task, I take it, is to describe, analyze, 
identify the obstacles to and anticipate the conse-
quences of this admirable yet problematical initia-
tive.
Why Penal Sanctions?
The purposes of penal sanctions in international 
law are largely coextensive with those in national 
legal orders. In both, sanctions are presumed 
generally to deter criminal acts, to protect society 
against confi rmed delinquents by isolating them, to 
reinforce the authority of violated norms and of the 
rule of law generally, to comfort victims and their 
kin, and, by doing public justice, to reduce recourse 
to the private variety. “[It has become ] an article of 
faith in the human rights community,” an American 
Professor wrote in 1993, “that judicial processes 
are a critical tool in ending and preventing viola-
tions of international law ... [and as providing] 
catharsis, honoring victims, stigmatizing tyranny, 
restoring legality, ‘bearing witness,’ or otherwise 
having dignitary functions.”1 Exemplifying Profes-
sor Bush’s observation, the human rights scholar/
activist Jelena Pejic wrote fi ve years later, on the 
eve of the diplomatic conference establishing the 
international criminal court: “It is recognized that 
human rights and the protections guaranteed under 
international humanitarian law will not be trans-
lated into practice unless potential offenders realize 
that a price for violations must be paid.”2 But that is 
not all, she adds, for in addition to its deterrent and 
protective value, the criminal process plays a key 
role in facilitating national reconciliation following 
civil armed confl icts: For if there is no individual 
accountability for crimes, she asserts, then victims 
will tend to impute criminality to the entire group 
from whose ranks the criminals sprang.3
 The virtuous effects identifi ed with criminal 
law are more easily assumed than proven and at the 
margins, at least, remain controversial. Scholars 
and practitioners of law debate the incidence and 
intensity of deterrence, the relationship in terms of 
crime reduction between deterrence and harsher 
sentences, the possibility and conditions of reha-
bilitation, punishment’s allegedly cathartic effect 
on victims and their kin. Less controversial are the 
claims that it inhibits recourse to private justice. 
These are old and complicated disputes. To join 
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them would carry me too far from the main focus 
of my inquiry and would offer dubious advantage. 
For if, as appears to be the case, Governments and 
humanitarians have rooted convictions about the ef-
fi cacy of penal measures, convictions which schol-
arly debate has not altered, it would be pretentious 
to imagine that agnostic conclusion on my part 
would change anything. Moreover, these convic-
tions spring from powerful intuitions or one might 
say from a collective projection by generally law 
abiding people of what they take to be their own 
or at least their neighbor’s reaction to the threat of 
criminal sanctions. In other words, on the basis of a 
sub-conscious canvass of their own hearts, people 
assume that in the absence of credible criminal 
sanctions, they and therefore others would far more 
frequently violate the law.
The Problem of Extrapolation
Belief about the potential effi cacy of penal sanc-
tions as vehicles for enforcing international law 
is a fairly straightforward extrapolation from the 
collective appreciation of law enforcement at the 
national level. Confi dence in this extrapolation is 
not universally shared. Do contextual differences 
between national and international enforcement 
make behavior in the former a doubtful basis for 
anticipating responses to a criminal justice system 
in the latter?
 One widely accepted dictum of domestic law 
enforcement is that a high probability of punish-
ment generally deters more effectively than a very 
severe sanction rarely applied or, more simply, 
“relative certainty trumps relative severity” as a 
rule of thumb for the allocation of enforcement re-
sources. The question, then, is whether the present 
and foreseeable nature of the international system 
reduces the risk of punishment to the point where 
on that ground alone it is unlikely to deter, even 
if on occasion persons are severely punished? By 
their very crimes, thugs may consolidate or seize 
control of sovereign states and thereby establish 
for themselves a comfortable refuge often with 
little fear of foreign intervention, particularly if 
they have succeeded in decimating opponents who 
might otherwise be transformed by external aid into 
a law enforcement vehicle for the global commu-
nity.
 A second question an agnostic might pose is 
whether a system shaped by the human rights 
sensibility in its most distilled form will tolerate 
effective procedures and intimidating punishments. 
Despite pleas from the post-holocaust government 
in Rwanda—in effect, therefore, from the survi-
vors—the United Nations denied its creation, the 
ad hoc criminal tribunal for Rwanda, the authority 
to impose capital punishment.4 Even life terms, 
with or without the prospect of parole, are deemed 
“inhuman” by some European civil libertarians.5 
Moreover, those convicted by the Tribunal will 
serve their sentence in a state designated by the 
International Tribunal from a list of States that have 
expressed willingness to take the convicted, provid-
ed that the prisons meet internationally recognized 
prison conditions. At present, however, there is no 
prison in Rwanda that even approaches internation-
ally recognized minimum prison conditions, raising 
the possibility that those convicted of master-
minding the genocide will serve their sentences 
in country-club settings, while those convicted by 
Rwandan courts will serve their time in appalling 
prison conditions.6
 The same sensibility may also hamper effec-
tive prosecution in those exceptional cases where 
the criminals fail to control the state or are seized 
in their own territory by a decisive intervenor or 
unsuccessfully risk foreign travel. Notions of due 
process appropriate to well developed democratic 
legal orders may place an insuperable burden on 
prosecutors when they are transferred wholesale to 
international criminal trials. Here too, the very ex-
tent of the crimes and brutality of their perpetrators 
may ironically facilitate the defense of the indefen-
sible. For instance, if witnesses or their relations 
still live in territory controlled or threatened by the 
defendants’ associates or principals, then unless the 
witnesses can testify anonymously, they may be 
reluctant and well advised not to testify at all. The 
ad hoc tribunal established by the Security Council 
in 1993 to prosecute “[p]ersons responsible for 
serious violations of international humanitarian law 
committed in the territory of the former Yugosla-
via”7 has in fact received anonymous testimony and 
promptly been criticized for doing so.8
 Convicting senior fi gures, like Milosevic of 
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Yugoslavia, who may give oral orders or nothing 
more than winks and nods and leave no paper trail, 
will be diffi cult unless courts shift the burden of 
proof to them, at least on the issue of intent, where 
their forces have perpetrated atrocities. This is not 
mere speculation. The New York Times, citing a 
senior American offi cial as its source, reports that 
“from the beginning, Mr. Milosevic sought to build 
a fi re wall around himself, to distance himself from 
indictable criminal acts carried out against Muslims 
during the war in Bosnia.”9 According to American 
intelligence, “Mr Milosevic has been in meetings 
where brutal operations against civilians were 
discussed, but he has allowed his underlings to do 
the talking, apparently fearing that the conversa-
tions might be monitored by sophisticated listening 
devices.”10
 The discussion of Milosevic’s efforts to evade 
indictment occurred in the context of a news report 
that the US State Department had issued warnings 
about possible prosecution to the named com-
manders of nine Yugoslavian army units operating 
in Kosovo. The US spokesperson declared that 
“Commanders can be indicted, prosecuted and, if 
found guilty, imprisoned not only for crimes they 
themselves commit, but also for failing to prevent 
crimes occurring or for failure to prosecute those 
who commit crimes.” He went on to say that “much 
of the evidence that the United States has against 
the nine commanders comes from interviews with 
refugees [who] are often able to identify military 
units operating in [areas from which they have 
fl ed].”
 But on the following day, persons connected to 
the Tribunal told another New York Times reporter 
that
[p]rosecutors require more than names of 
military commanders or even witness accounts 
about cruelty and killing. To build their case 
against commanders, they need to link those re-
sponsible for crimes directly to the events and to 
present proof of who gave orders and who knew 
about the atrocities.11
To import wholesale into war crimes prosecutions, 
prosecutions of persons who have been driving the 
juggernaut of the state, the safeguards developed to 
protect the poor and defenseless against the jugger-
naut of the state may fairly be seen as the exer-
cise of an addled will to fail. Once the prosecutor 
demonstrates that a determinate unit commanded 
by the defendant had operational responsibility 
for the territory where atrocities were committed, 
the burden of proof should shift to the defendant 
to show that he or she could not reasonably have 
known of the atrocities or could not have prevented 
them. Similarly, when the prosecutors demonstrate 
a pattern of violations by the armed forces (includ-
ing paramilitaries) of a government or faction, the 
head of government and all ministers with respon-
sibilities related to the confl ict (or repression) and 
the most senior offi cers of the armed forces should 
be required to establish by a preponderance of the 
evidence that they were unaware of the atrocities or 
tried and failed to prevent them from occurring.
 Civil libertarians in common law countries and 
lawyers generally in civil law countries may object 
to plea bargains, a controversial but powerful 
instrument of prosecutors in the United States and 
are almost certain to rail against broad conspiracy 
counts in the indictment which are alien to the civil 
law but have been used effectively against criminal 
organizations in the United States. They will also 
resist employing the Nuremberg Charter tool of 
prosecuting for membership in elite organizations 
specializing in systematic torture and massacre, 
organizations like the Nazi SD and Gestapo.
 Civil libertarians will also tend to oppose trials 
in absentia. Yet such trials are the only means of 
reaching perpetrators who remain in control of or 
protected by the states in whose names they have 
slaughtered. Conviction after a trial in absentia 
is much more than a symbolic exercise. In the 
fi rst place, it permanently limits the perpetrator’s 
movements. That itself should infl ict some modest 
degree of unpleasantness. In addition, it places the 
defendants permanently at risk from a change in lo-
cal power balances. Moreover, if they are function-
aries rather than masters of the state, they must live 
with the oppressive knowledge that those actually 
in command of the state may fi nd it convenient to 
trade them for a reciprocal benefi t.
 A second and possibly more compelling vir-
tue of trial in absentia is its implications for the 
economic agendas of latent delinquents. Convic-
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tion could facilitate worldwide confi scation of the 
delinquents’ assets, assuming confi scation were one 
of the sanctions at the disposal of an international 
criminal tribunal, as it should be. National govern-
ments would, of course, have to adopt legislation 
requiring the executive branch to assist in the 
identifi cation of assets attributable to the convicted 
person and requiring the judicial one to enforce the 
tribunal’s confi scation orders.
 A third source of unease about the extrapolation 
is the presence in the international sphere of both 
national and multinational community interests that 
will often compete powerfully against the inter-
est in enforcing penal sanctions. Economic and 
environmental interdependence, porous borders, 
weapons of mass destruction: All are prominent 
among the contextual feature of the present interna-
tional system that lend governments and often the 
insurgents in minor states a sharply higher level of 
systematically disruptive power than, in general, 
they have previously enjoyed. They may drive 
hordes of refugees across borders, destroy great 
tracts of rain forest, or credibly threaten terrorist at-
tacks on nuclear power plants, dams or commercial 
air line systems. Imagine the disruptive effect on 
economy and society in Europe or the United States 
(or a host of other places for that matter) if it were 
believed that a few terrorists with hand-held anti-
aircraft missiles were in position to attack civilian 
planes. The havoc infl icted on Colombia for half a 
decade by the Medellin cocaine cartel led by Pablo 
Escobar, a cartel with no more than a few hundred 
core operatives, suggests the rising nihilistic power 
even of relatively small but well organized criminal 
groups. In short, potential defendants may neither 
control a powerful state nor enjoy this support in 
order to discourage law enforcement by their per-
ceived capacity both to escalate and to expand their 
delinquencies. In that way they may confront law-
supporting states with the grim choice of fl inching 
and thereby undermining the international rule of 
law or plunging ahead possibly at huge costs to the 
public interest.
 A fourth barrier to easy extrapolation is the 
inchoate character of the “global community.” A 
legal order is a set of norms and supporting institu-
tions that shape expectations about how one should 
and how others probably will behave most of the 
time. Because the international legal order is very 
decentralized, self-declared “realists” dismiss it as 
nothing more than a cosmetic thinly concealing the 
pocked face of power. Their premise, of course, is 
that law regulates behavior only where it is backed 
by intimidating force. In the absence of police and 
troops to execute their orders, courts are impotent 
and law a dangerous illusion.
 The evident fl aw in the realists’ argument is 
its reliance on a cramped view of legal order and 
of the means available for its enforcement. They 
rely on a criminal-law paradigm, a hellish vision 
of society in which all of us are latent criminals 
restrained from villainy by fear of punishment 
alone. And they correspondingly ignore the facilita-
tive dimension of law: Law as a means of enabling 
persons to cooperate over time by embodying their 
collective goals in a body of rules, principles and 
policies. Imagine, for instance, a group of steel-
workers who become the joint-owners of a bank-
rupt company in the hope of restoring its viability. 
Having no bosses, they can, indeed they must de-
cide on work rules that will express their common 
interest in producing steel effi ciently and safely.
 Of course the image is too pretty. Character 
and energy being distributed unequally, the “free-
rider” problem will no doubt insinuate itself into 
this Elysium. We can anticipate that some workers 
will be tempted to substitute recreational diver-
sions for work assignments. But particularly where 
the number of workers are few and cooperation is 
highly integrated and so clandestine rule evasion is 
diffi cult, the threats both of enterprise failure and 
of the collective exclusion of malingerers from this 
system of cooperation may suffi ce to keep cheat-
ing to a workable minimum. These are precisely 
the types of threats or sanctions that operate in the 
international system of sovereign states, compli-
cated, of course, by the fact that though the number 
of states is small, unlike the individual steelworkers 
none of them possesses a single consciousness and 
will. Instead their policies are determined in part by 
internal concerns and parochial politics which may 
often take little account of external commitments.
 Whether at the international or the village level 
of social life, the law-as-a-system-of-cooperation 
paradigm fi ts when there is in fact a consensus 
about means and ends. In certain areas of inter-
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national life—such as ocean navigation and com-
mercial air fl ight and diplomatic intercourse—con-
sensus is high and compliance with the rules 
embodying it predictable. The question relevant to 
this paper is whether the same can be said for the 
rules limiting the power of governments to repress 
challenges to their authority. Skeptics about the po-
tential infl uence of international criminal sanctions 
might argue that consensus is not universal and is 
particularly weak among elites with a fragile grip 
on power or running countries with restless minori-
ties. For such elites, treaties may well be little more 
than scraps of paper.
 Dissent from the application of criminal sanc-
tions to hooligan leaders, skeptics might fairly 
argue, is not limited to hooligan leaders. It can 
be spied at the very heart of the Western World. 
One need only recall the recent decision of Great 
Britain’s Law Lords in the Pinochet case. There 
we had the spectacle of fi ve out of seven success-
fully straining, like people fi nishing a diffi cult 
stool, to so construe the law of extradition as to 
narrow maximally the basis and hence prospects 
for extraditing the unrepentant butcher even as they 
purported to uphold the humanitarian claim that ex 
heads of state are not immune. Similarly, in Spain 
the government itself sought to insulate Pinochet 
from prosecution by appealing over the head of the 
examining magistrate, Baltasar Garzon, for a ruling 
that Spain had no jurisdiction to try the general for 
crimes committed outside the country.12
 The gravity of the interests at stake is a fi nal 
source of skepticism about the ability of criminal 
sanctions to infl uence the behavior of parties in a 
civil armed confl ict. By the time tensions between 
groups turn violent, they normally have demonized 
each other and convinced themselves that defeat, 
unlike the loss of most inter-state confl icts, means 
the utter physical destruction of their respective 
communities. Moreover, civil confl ict is by defi ni-
tion coterminous with the collapse of public order. 
The remote threat of criminal sanctions, it could be 
argued, will not resonate in the paranoid world of 
domestic armed confl ict.
 The predictive value of these various caveats 
about reliance on penal sanctions is likely to de-
pend to some degree on the character of the interna-
tional criminal justice system that gets put in place. 
Certainly they deserve a place among the concerns 
of the system’s architects and those who assess 
their work. It is with those caveats in mind that I 
turn now to the system that is beginning to appear.
The Norms
The authors of the draft treaty submitted in the 
summer of 1998 to the diplomatic representatives 
gathered in Rome to negotiate the terms of an 
International Criminal Court had proposed three 
categories of crime. They essentially reiterate those 
contained in the Charter of the post World War II 
Nuremberg Tribunal which specifi ed crimes against 
the humanitarian laws of war (i.e. “war crimes”), 
crimes, against peace and against humanity.
 War Crimes: For the most part codifi ed in the 
Hague Conventions on Land Warfare, the Geneva 
Conventions of 1949 and the Two Protocols Ad-
ditional of 1977, they function primarily to protect 
civilians and soldiers who have surrendered or 
been rendered hors de combat, broadly speaking 
all non-combatants. In addition, through the norm 
prohibiting gratuitously cruel weapons and the trea-
ties prohibiting use of bacteriological and chemi-
cal weapons, they offer limited protection even to 
combatants.
 This corpus of norms comprehensively covers 
inter-state war scenarios and, in that context, com-
mands a broad international consensus. Its appli-
cation in civil confl icts is more problematic. The 
almost universally adopted Geneva Conventions 
contain a common Article three which alone ap-
plies to such confl icts. It prohibits torture, summary 
execution and, more generally, cruel treatment. But 
under the convention, it applies only in the case of 
“armed confl icts not of an international character.” 
And it has been the consistent practice of govern-
ments struggling with insurgents to deny Article 
three’s applicability on the grounds that they are 
merely conducting police operations rather than a 
true armed confl ict, as if the latter could be said to 
exist only where insurgents control and govern a 
large swathe of territory like the Confederacy in the 
American Civil War. Protocol Additional II goes 
well beyond Article Three in detailing humanitar-
ian norms applicable to civil confl icts. But not only 
does it enjoy less widespread acceptance than the 
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Geneva Conventions, in addition it too is subject to 
the claim that it applies only in the instance of full-
scale civil war.13
 Without any international tribunal available to 
assess such claims, governments have, until re-
cently, been far freer to make them with reasonable 
expectation of acquiescence from the many states 
whose governing elites can envision themselves 
some day engaged in a similar sort of struggle and 
hence inclined to keep their options open. Until 
recently, rigid conceptions of sovereignty as a high 
wall blocking external appreciation of a state’s in-
ternal behavior (conceptions that developed several 
centuries ago) reinforced a state’s freedom to defi ne 
internal struggles out of the reach of the Article 
Three. Any advantage in so doing has, however, 
fallen in conjunction with the rise of human rights 
norms some of which are generally conceded to be 
non-derogable, that is, not subject to suspension in 
time of emergency. In addition, by making effective 
their core claim that a state’s treatment of people 
within its territory is subject to international stand-
ards, human rights norms have transformed ideas 
about the prerogatives of sovereignty and hence, 
inevitably, views about the conditions in which the 
laws of war are applicable.
 Crimes Against Humanity:14The authors of the 
Nuremberg Tribunal’s charter included this cat-
egory of criminality in order to cover the slaughter 
of Jews and other targets of the Nazis who were 
citizens of Germany or its allies, since German 
troops and paramilitary units operating on the 
territory of allied states were not occupiers within 
the meaning of the applicable convention. Yet 
they were sensitive to the anticipatable charge that 
convicting the senior Nazis for committing this 
newly defi ned crime would violate the fundamental 
principle sine lege.15 Hence they limited its appli-
cability to slaughter that occurred in the course of 
aggressive war, as if by doing so they might make 
it almost indistinguishable from traditional war 
crimes.16 Moreover, they could argue that during 
the war, the allied powers had issued warnings that 
German leaders would be held responsible for all 
inhuman acts violating the conscience of mankind 
and therefore they had suffi cient notice to satisfy 
the rationale of the sine lege principle. Professor 
Paust has enumerated various uses of the term long 
before Nuremberg, for instance in the 1915 con-
demnation by Great Britain, France and Russia of 
the Armenian massacres in Turkey.17 The defend-
ants, and some legal pundits with a presumably 
more objective perspective, nevertheless insisted 
that even if the acts charged violated customary in-
ternational law, responsibility for them had hitherto 
been attributable to states only. To satisfy the sine 
lege principle they therefore argued, it would have 
been necessary to have precedents for individual 
criminal responsibility. In short, while the defend-
ants might have had full knowledge that they were 
committing grave violations of international law, 
they had a right to rely on the historical practice 
of states to treat each other as the sole subjects of 
international law. Of course they made the same 
claim in connection with the charges of conspiring 
to wage and waging aggressive war.18 Even today, 
legal thought is not entirely immune to this sort of 
formalism.
 The Nuremberg convictions and developments 
since then have, I believe, knocked the struts from 
under this shaky claim. If Nuremberg were the only 
precedent for individual criminal responsibility, 
then one might dismiss it as an aberration. But it is 
not. The 1948 Genocide Convention, which enjoys 
virtually universal adherence, envisions criminal 
liability for perpetrators and makes prosecution an 
international obligation of countries with speci-
fi ed jurisdiction. So does the much more recent 
convention prohibiting torture. So even those odd 
legal positivists who think it unjust to punish mass 
murderers if there is no penal system in place at the 
time of their crimes would have to concede that the 
genocidists of Rwanda and the assorted criminals 
who rampage through ex-Yugoslavia had suffi cient 
notice that they risked criminal punishment.
 Waging Aggressive War: The Nuremberg pros-
ecutors and later the Tribunal in fi nding culpability 
relied primarily on the 1928 Treaty for the Renun-
ciation of War as an Instrument of National Policy, 
the so-called Kellogg-Briand Pact. In reviewing 
a book on Nuremberg, Professor Jonathan Bush 
claims that prior to Nuremberg, “[i]nternational law 
had long defi ned and condemned aggression.”19 If 
so, there is special irony in the fact that for some 
three decades after Nuremberg and despite or liter-
ally because of endless debate, the United Nations 
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failed to discover a defi nition that summoned broad 
agreement among its members. Although conceived 
until now as a delinquency peculiar to inter-state 
relations, the crime (however defi ned) is relevant 
in a number of ways to our discussion of internal 
confl ict.
 In the fi rst place, if, as many governments and 
scholars have claimed since the adoption of the UN 
Charter, force used for any purpose other than self 
defense against an armed attack by another state is 
aggression, then humanitarian interventions to halt 
genocide and arrest its perpetrators would itself be 
criminal. Supporters of this confi ning defi nition 
organize the universe of force into three categories: 
aggression, self-defense and enforcement meas-
ures authorized or ordered by the Security Council 
under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. During the 
Cold War, the US championed a more nuanced set 
of categories. It upheld the power of regional and 
sub-regional organizations to legitimize forceful 
measures without Security Council approval. And it 
claimed lawful authority to initiate reprisals against 
a state for terrorist attack or sustained “low-inten-
sity” belligerence.
 Governments and scholars remain divided 
about the conditions for the legitimate employment 
of force. Some scholars have claimed there ex-
ists legal authority for unilateral intervention as a 
last recourse to prevent gross violations of human 
rights, even to restore democracy.20 But the stricter 
view, resting on the most straightforward reading of 
the Charter, still enjoys considerable support and, 
particularly in light of the World Court’s opinion in 
the Nicaragua case, that view might prevail in the 
opinions of the ICC. Concern about this risk shaped 
US opposition to including aggression among the 
crimes over which the ICC would exercise jurisdic-
tion.
 The concept of aggression might, however, be 
re-conceived to make it a tool against rather than 
a potential shield for mass murderers and ethnic 
cleansers. Rather than being limited to inter-state 
wars, it might be conscripted for service in inter-
nal confl icts and used there to criminalize violent 
repression and the initiation of armed confl ict by 
one faction, government or insurgent. This would 
have to be done, of course, with due regard for the 
right of properly constituted authorities to maintain 
order and territorial integrity. Otherwise it would be 
a license for terrorism and secession.
 It is not hard to imagine a set of manageable 
criteria, manageable in the sense that they could be 
applied consistently by courts. One might start with 
the proposition that governments have a right to use 
force, within the bounds of international humani-
tarian and human rights law, to maintain territorial 
integrity. On the other hand, they have obligations 
to respect the rights of minorities, rights that are in-
creasingly well defi ned in international instruments. 
The sustained failure to respect those rights would, 
then, lead to forfeiture of the right to employ force 
against secessionists. Once that right were forfeit, 
use of force would be “aggression.” Aggression 
could also be found where one party to an internal 
confl ict disregards a call for cease fi re issuing from 
the Security Council or, perhaps, the General As-
sembly or a relevant regional organization.
Institutions
For the foreseeable future, national criminal justice 
systems must serve as the principal executors of 
international penal law. That was as clear to the 
architects of the Nuremberg Tribunal as it is to their 
contemporary successors. The former reserved the 
International Tribunal for trial of the senior of-
fi cials of Nazidom. The tens, indeed hundreds of 
thousands who had executed their commands were 
left to national trials of which there were many 
and which continue to this day.21 Any other course 
would have required the construction of a huge 
bureaucratic apparatus at great cost and delay.
 Today there are no fewer candidates for indict-
ment. Tens of thousands joined to make the Rwan-
dan holocaust possible. And they are only a small 
fraction of those who, in purlieus as widely spaced 
as Chile and the Sudan, have during the past thirty 
years committed crimes against humanity. Not 
only would it take years and vast sums to produce 
a criminal justice apparatus—judges, prosecutors, 
bailiffs, marshals, investigators—able to cope with 
the potential catch, in addition the system could not 
function independently without a broad permission 
to exercise its functions, including its investigative 
activities, within states. Such permission would 
constitute a cession of sovereign rights that is not 
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yet thinkable within the political cultures of many 
states. After all, one of the oldest and clearest and 
most fi ercely defended rules of international law 
prohibits one state from exercising any judicial 
function within the territory of another without its 
permission. Permission has very rarely been grant-
ed, for a monopoly of law enforcement authority 
is accurately seen as a defi ning feature of national 
independence. One need only recall the furious re-
action of the Mexican Congress in 1998 to the scam 
conducted by US agents operating under cover on 
both sides of the border which exposed the money-
laundering activities of Mexican bankers.
 In authorizing establishment of the ad hoc tribu-
nals for international crimes committed in former 
Yugoslavia and in Rwanda, the Security Council 
took account of these realities in that it made no 
effort to give the tribunals exclusive jurisdiction. 
It did, however, give them a superior status in the 
sense that, once they choose to hear a particular 
case, the national courts are required to defer. The 
treaty establishing the ICC reverses the order of 
precedence. The ICC is supposed to “complement” 
national courts. Its statute “explicitly establishes 
that a case will, inter alia, be inadmissible before 
the ICC whenever it is being investigated or pros-
ecuted by a state which has jurisdiction, unless the 
state is ‘unwilling or unable genuinely’ to carry out 
the investigation or prosecution.22 Consistent with 
the logic of complementarity, a case is inadmis-
sible when it has been investigated by a state with 
jurisdiction which has decided not to prosecute the 
accused, unless the international prosecutor can 
convince the ICC that the state’s decision resulted 
from “unwillingness or inability genuinely” to 
investigate or prosecute.
 The effort to construct an effective system for 
applying penal law at the international level raises 
many of the same issues encountered in domestic 
jurisdictions. All criminal tribunals require means 
for investigating alleged crimes, compelling the ac-
cused’s appearance, conducting fair trials (which is 
normally deemed to include a right of appeal) and 
executing sentences. Since most UN member states 
appear unready to concede to any international 
institution a general authority to arrest and detain 
persons wanted as defendants or material witnesses 
or to enter premises and seize pertinent documents, 
any now imaginable international tribunal must 
rely on states to perform these functions for it. The 
ad hoc tribunals for ex-Yugoslavia and Rwanda 
enjoy the formal authority to command coopera-
tion granted to them by the Security Council acting 
under Chapter VII. In theory, then, where national 
authorities refuse a request, the tribunals can apply 
to the Council for sanctions against the obdurate 
government. The Council’s readiness to enforce the 
demands of its creation has not yet been tested but 
could soon be if, for instance, Croatia persistently 
refuses to deliver to the Yugoslavia Tribunal one or 
another of its nationals who has been indicted for 
war crimes.
 The International Criminal Court, should it actu-
ally materialize, will be less well armed, at least in 
theory. Being a creature of treaty, its legal authority 
will be limited in most respects to those states that 
ratify it.23 And it will have no formal right of appeal 
to the Security Council in the event of non-per-
formance by a treaty party. At best, the Tribunal’s 
president or prosecutor could persuade a sympa-
thetic state to bring an instance of non-compliance 
to the Security Council’s attention if it could be 
plausibly associated with a threat to international 
peace.
 Despite the Pinochet case, it is fair to note a 
growing readiness at least of liberal democratic 
states to cooperate in punishing violators of inter-
national criminal law. The Euro-Canadian push 
to establish the ICC testifi es to a changing politi-
cal and moral sensibility. In a paradoxical way, 
so does the Pinochet case taken in all its parts: Its 
initiation within the Spanish judicial system; the 
ambivalence rather than focused hostility of Spain’s 
executive branch (while its Attorney-General was 
fi ghting to abort, its Foreign Minister was claiming 
that his government would take no action to block 
extradition); even the House of Lords’ judgment to 
the extent it rejected the view that former heads of 
state enjoyed immunity for crimes committed by 
them when in offi ce. One reasonably can, therefore, 
anticipate a growing measure of compliance by 
governments with their obligations to cooperate in 
global law enforcement. How extensive are their 
extant obligations, particularly their obligations 
under customary international law that is binding 
irrespective of applicable treaties? In particular, do 
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their obligations extend to the key task of actively 
seeking and arresting accused persons and extradit-
ing them for trial (where the arresting state does not 
itself choose to prosecute?
 A growing number of legal scholars answer the 
second question affi rmatively. They stand on rea-
sonably fi rm ground. The notion of such an obliga-
tion is hardly novel. It is foreshadowed in Common 
Article 49 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions which 
provides that
Each High Contracting Party shall be under the 
obligation to search for persons alleged to have 
committed, or to have ordered to be committed, 
such grave breaches, and shall bring such per-
sons, regardless of their nationality, before its 
own courts. It may also, if it prefers, and in ac-
cordance with the provisions of its own legisla-
tion, hand such persons over for trial to another 
High Contracting Party concerned, provided 
such High Contracting Party has made out a 
prima facie case.24
The grave breaches to which it refers—including 
wilful killing and torture or inhuman treatment—
are unfortunately limited to inter-state confl icts; 
they do not include violations of common article 
three’s regulations for civil wars. Nevertheless, in 
that they impose an obligation on states to seize, 
detain and prosecute or extradite persons who 
may not be their own nationals or have committed 
crimes against their nationals, the Conventions are 
a milestone in the development of the procedural 
side of international criminal law. With respect to 
internal violence, the almost coincident milestone 
is the 1948 Genocide Convention. While it looked 
primarily to prosecution by the state where a per-
petrator was found, it gave the arresting state the 
future option of transferring the accused to an inter-
national tribunal should one be established. Since 
the late 1940’s, conventions criminalizing various 
acts as threats to the general interest of peoples and 
states and requiring prosecution or extradition have 
multiplied.25 Enumerating some sixty-four of them, 
at least one scholar concludes that their cumulative 
evidentiary weight confi rms the evolution of a rule 
of customary law.26
 Whether acting from a sense of legal or of moral 
obligation, most states willing to cooperate with 
the ICC need correspondingly to alter or modify 
national laws and regulations. This is particularly 
true for a country like Great Britain—where the 
courts refuse to apply international norms until they 
are formally incorporated by Parliamentary Act into 
domestic law—or the United States where custom-
ary international law is subordinate to Congres-
sional acts (and, arguably, Executive decrees), even 
if earlier in time, and treaties are rarely deemed 
self-executing. Moreover, whatever the actual sta-
tus of international obligations in domestic law and 
their theoretical applicability to a given case, the 
United States experience is that lower court judges 
and many lawyers lack awareness of international 
norms and when made aware, may still ignore or 
misconstrue them on behalf of personal agendas. 
Elaboration and clarifi cation at the highest level of 
government of the commitment to collaborate with 
international tribunals should heighten awareness 
and inhibit evasion and distortion of international 
law.
 The commitment to cooperation entails at a 
minimum the following elements. First, effective 
provision for extradition. Countries with well de-
veloped legal systems generally do not recognize in 
the executive power a unilateral right to extradite27. 
They require either legislative authorization or a 
preexisting international agreement. Some stand-
ard elements of extradition treaties will require 
modifi cation. For instance, such agreements often 
specifi cally exclude nationals from their reach, 
that is most of the people over whom any state has 
jurisdiction. In addition, they generally contain 
exceptions for so-called “political crimes” which 
some US judges have defi ned as crimes of any 
kind committed by members of organized groups 
for political reasons.28 Virtually all of the potential 
defendants in international criminal trials could 
shelter under that construction. Furthermore, states 
would need to eliminate the standard double crimi-
nality requirement—the offense charged must be a 
crime in both countries at the time of the extradi-
tion request29—if they were unwilling to include 
international crimes in their own criminal codes.
 Secondly, effective cooperation entails provid-
ing international courts with access to witnesses 
both at the investigative and trial stages of a pro-
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ceeding. Providing access to those who are will-
ing to meet with international tribunal prosecutors 
requires nothing more than permission for the latter 
to enter and exercise judicial functions, permission 
the executive can doubtless grant. Unwilling wit-
nesses provide a considerably more challenging set 
of procedural and political problems. Compelling 
their appearance for interrogation by agents of the 
ICC’s Prosecutor within the country and subject to 
all of its constitutional protections would obviously 
be less problematical than attempting to compel 
their presence before the Tribunal where, if they 
remain obdurate, they might be found in contempt 
and imprisoned. The domestic political rever-
berations of this scenario could be considerable. 
Whether it raises serious constitutional issues under 
provisions comparable to the US due process clause 
is less clear; but surely constitutional issues would 
be argued in a suit to block coerced removal of a 
citizen to another jurisdiction without any showing 
or even claim that the citizen was him or herself 
criminally responsible for the acts charged in the 
foreign trial.
 International tribunals will also require assist-
ance in securing documentary evidence whether 
through judicial compulsion or searches and 
seizures conducted by the executive. There is both 
precedent and experience in this area as a result of 
the mutual legal assistance treaties that have begun 
to proliferate largely in response to the globaliza-
tion of organized crime.30 But the treaties them-
selves and practice thereunder reveal at least one 
common defect, namely their frequent failure to 
secure cooperation in the pursuit of the assets of 
delinquents or of proof that such assets exist.31
 Armed confl ict—with its murky and repressive 
ambience— often provides unusual opportunities 
and incentives for corruption, indeed wholesale 
asset stripping by government offi cials and lead-
ers of armed factions. Its risks encourage export of 
fi nancial assets (whether acquired during or before 
the confl ict) to one or another venue in the global 
archipelago of fi nancial safe havens generally 
located in picturesque and sunny places with good 
cuisine. Criminal penalties can and should include 
confi scation of assets. Indeed, the credible threat 
of confi scation may surpass the threat of imprison-
ment as an instrument of infl uence for external ac-
tors attempting to promote peaceful settlement and 
to restrain atrocity. Military victory, howsoever se-
cured, provides the winners with a safe haven from 
prosecution, but cannot by itself protect resources 
previously shipped to foreign venues.
 War crimes prosecutions, whether occurring in 
national courts or international tribunals, should 
be able to reach, initially freeze and ultimately 
confi scate the assets of delinquents. In prosecuting 
its war against drug traffi ckers, the United States 
has had fair success in pressuring and persuading 
foreign governments to cooperate with searches for 
drug-traffi cking proceeds. But haven states have 
resisted lowering the bank secrecy bar with respect 
to investigations into other crimes.
 To be maximally effective, an assault on exter-
nally-held assets requires all states with jurisdiction 
over fi nancial havens to adopt a legislative package 
with the following features: First, it must authorize 
or, preferably, require the executive and judicial 
branches to cooperate with investigations conduct-
ed by foreign national and international tribunals; 
secondly, it must modify laws imposing criminal 
or civil penalties on employees of fi nancial institu-
tions who reveal information about the transactions 
of their institutions; thirdly (and perhaps most 
controversially), it must require fi nancial institu-
tions to make good faith efforts to identify and 
thereafter to maintain records concerning the real 
identity of ultimate parties in interest. The diffi cul-
ties successor governments have encountered in 
trying to track the plunderings of notorious dicta-
tors underscore the need to increase transparency in 
global fi nancial centers and tax havens.  Obvi-
ously the competition among fi nancial centers for 
“hot money” will inhibit the requisite changes in 
law and policy unless they are done in concert. The 
gradual albeit slight lowering of the bars to money-
laundering investigations and, more recently, to 
inquiries into the disposition of assets belonging to 
persons consumed by the European Holocaust and 
their survivors, attest to the power of the United 
States in particular, much less the Group of Seven 
acting together, to pry open the closed windows of 
other jurisdictions favored by runaway capital.
 Cooperation with international tribunals, wheth-
er established by Security Council Resolution or a 
broadly ratifi ed treaty, is a moral imperative. Does 
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the same imperative apply to the operations of 
national tribunals seeking assistance purportedly in 
order to enforce the relevant international norms? 
Is there not much greater danger there of inadvert-
ently helping to advance illicit essays in revenge 
or sheer predation marching under the banner of 
humanitarianism?
 Rooted in a political order of sovereign states, 
designed by those states to express, defi ne and 
defend sovereignty, international law has served 
rather to separate than to universalize the sum of 
global authority to make and apply law. The author-
ity of each state’s duly constituted authorities to 
decide what behavior shall be tolerated or required 
on its territory or on the part of its nationals and to 
enforce such decisions has been a defi ning feature 
of national sovereignty. Within the tolerances of 
international law, states have also authorized them-
selves to prohibit and punish acts albeit committed 
by aliens in foreign venues where such acts are 
directed against them as in the case of a conspiracy 
to counterfeit their currency. And, though not 
without dissent, states have occasionally asserted 
the authority to outlaw assaults on their nationals 
abroad, although in doing so in effect they extend 
their legislative jurisdiction into the sovereign 
space of other states. But until very recently, they 
have rarely recognized a general right to legislate 
against and punish acts, regardless of where they 
occur and who is the victim, simply on the grounds 
that the acts in question threaten universally shared 
interests.
 Piracy was one of the rare exceptions. Now 
there are, at least arguably, quite a few more. 
Widely ratifi ed treaties impose “extradite or pros-
ecute” obligations primarily in connection with 
terrorist acts (attacks on air lines and on diplomatic 
personnel, for instance) and gross violations of 
human rights (such as torture).32 Wide ratifi cation, 
repetition (torture, for instance, is prohibited in, 
among other texts, the Geneva Conventions, the In-
ternational Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 
regional human rights instruments and the torture 
convention itself), the clandestine character of 
violations and the absence of offi cial defenders col-
lectively evidence the incorporation into customary 
international law of certain prohibitions initially es-
tablished by treaty. In the face of this development, 
states now have discretion to prosecute transient 
aliens for various crimes against human rights and 
humanitarian law, crimes committed abroad against 
other aliens, even where the state is not obligated to 
do so by virtue of being a party to a prosecute-or-
extradite treaty.
 A world swarming with police and prosecutors 
on the lookout for those who have killed, maimed, 
raped, tortured and ethnically cleansed and with 
courts ready to try the villains might well seem 
rather more intimidating to prospective Pinoc-
hets and Idi Amins than one marked by a solitary 
tribunal in the Hague or wherever. How might this 
happy prospect come about in a world where past 
or present high ranking villains have become ac-
customed to traveling or even settling here or there 
without great diffi culty much less fear of incarcera-
tion? Perhaps the fi rst few instances of vigorous 
national enforcement of international criminal law 
might generate powerful pressures on other govern-
ments to follow suit or at the very least to deny safe 
havens to murderous former heads of state like the 
ones provided for Idi Amin in Saudi Arabia and 
Mengistu Haile Mariam in Zimbabwe. There could 
be a general ripping aside of the veil of immunity 
for government offi cials.
 Quite apart from the plausibility of this scenar-
io, does it provide grounds for concern no less than 
for anticipatory jubilation? One ground for concern 
is possible abuse of loosened restraints on national 
jurisdiction. The risk of contestable use and incon-
testable abuse should grow in rough proportion 
to the variety of delinquencies seen to justify the 
assertion of universal jurisdiction. Consider, for 
instance, the crime of “aggression” conditionally 
included in the Statute for the new International 
Criminal Court.33 Its position buttressed by the Stat-
ute’s recognition that such a crime exists, a state 
might include the crime in its penal code, exclude 
statutes of limitations, make jurisdiction limitless 
and adopt the view that any use of force for pur-
poses other than defense against an armed attack 
or execution of a Security Council mandate or 
license under Chapter VII of the Charter constitutes 
the crime. Since that defi nition would embrace 
the current NATO operation against the Milosevic 
and his colleagues, senior civilian and military 
offi cials in all nineteen NATO countries would be 
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liable to prosecution in country X as long as they 
live. Moreover, as notions about the legitimacy of 
universal jurisdictional assertions by national courts 
gain currency, in future years country X might be 
able to secure their arrest and extradition by third 
countries.
 A second ground for concern is the slight meas-
ure of due process that obtains in many countries. 
So even one prosecuting in good faith may do so 
by means that could easily lead to miscarriages of 
justice.
 Populist reactions to the prosecution of fellow 
citizens in far off countries with unfamiliar legal 
codes will push governments to protest or take 
strong measures even in cases where, in the eyes of 
neutral observers, the prosecuting state appears to 
be acting in good faith. It seems fair to suspect that 
the proliferation of international criminal trials by 
national courts will add to the sum total of acri-
mony among states. One way of reducing the risk 
of abuse and the certainty of acrimony would be to 
achieve an international consensus that judgments 
in national trials must be appealable to the Inter-
national Criminal Court. That would, of course, 
require an amendment to the Court’s statute and 
probably an expansion in its numbers. Achieving 
consensus is not likely to prove easy particularly 
since what I am proposing constitutes ceding 
ultimate power away from national judiciaries, a 
concession that could raise constitutional no less 
than political issues in many states.
Individual Criminal Responsibility, Peace 
Processes and Transitions to Democracy
One ground for concern which applies to inter-
national as well as national enforcement of inter-
national criminal law is the impact of threatened 
criminal prosecutions on efforts to negotiate the 
settlement of civil armed confl icts and transi-
tions from authoritarian to democratic regimes. In 
recent years, immunity from prosecution has been 
a prominent and contentious issue particularly in 
democratic transitions.34 Among scholars and activ-
ists, debate has swirled around the ethical and legal 
propriety of blanket amnesties. Exposure without 
punishment, once championed as a means of recon-
ciling antagonists without derailing peaceful settle-
ment or transition, has disappointed, at least in the 
former respect. Still, in some cases, impunity (with 
or without exposure) has probably been essential to 
democratic transitions and peace.
 One might argue that the combination of an in-
ternational criminal tribunal and national tribunals 
with jurisdiction to punish humanitarian crimes 
committed abroad allows a necessary measure of 
fl exibility in managing transitions or peace nego-
tiations without sacrifi cing all the imagined and 
probably to some degree real virtues of criminal 
sanctions. Negotiators, after all, can give no more 
than they have. They can guarantee Pinochet’s ilk 
impunity at home, but cannot assure their freedom 
to take tea abroad with honorable and right honor-
able persons or to exercise their human right to 
shop at Gucci in Miami. If the ICC stood alone as 
a threat to the pleasures of retirement, sociopathic 
leaders in states that had become parties (presuma-
bly during some earlier democratic interlude) could 
simply withdraw from the treaty establishing the 
court prior to relinquishing power or agreeing to 
autonomy for or power sharing with some insurgent 
group. The beauty of national tribunals enforcing 
international criminal law is their immunity to such 
ploys. They would not be providing merely a forum 
to enforce foreign law, civil or criminal. For in that 
event, normally35 they would apply the substan-
tive law of the foreign jurisdiction, hence the law 
granting immunity. No, they would be applying 
international law and it would not be affected by 
arrangements between the contending parties.
 To me it seems implausible that the risk of 
prosecution in a foreign jurisdiction or an interna-
tional tribunal would weigh heavily on the issue of 
democratic transition or domestic peace. Moreo-
ver, if national and international law conspire to 
treat state terrorists no better than the private sort, 
then it should not weigh at all, since, in terms of 
the opportunities to cavort abroad, state killers 
would gain nothing of formal value. To be sure, 
they might conceivably calculate that by retaining 
power, they retain ways to extract concessions, 
including de facto immunity, from states that need 
to deal with them concerning one or another of the 
many issues (from global warming to transnational 
crime) that crowd the contemporary diplomatic 
agenda. Still, conceding the other and far larger 
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stakes on the table in negotiations to end a confl ict 
or effect a transition, it is hard to believe that this 
one could matter very much.
 An obligation to punish is most likely to confl ict 
with the strategic and humanitarian interest in the 
early termination of civil confl icts where powerful 
external actors—possibly acting at the behest of the 
United Nations or a regional organization—are em-
ploying armed mediation on behalf of peace. That 
was Bosnia and in a sense Haiti as well. Political 
and military leaders who feel themselves vulner-
able to prosecution will then be demanding impu-
nity from the very countries with the means to grant 
it de facto by refusing to deliver the miscreants to 
an international tribunal or to prosecute them in 
their national courts. Western governments with 
troops in Bosnia have felt the fl ail of public opinion 
for failing to arrest notorious war criminals. Even 
negotiating with them has been a problem.
 Making Security Council permission a condi-
tion for an international court initiating investiga-
tions much less seeking the arrest of persons where 
investigation has led to indictment would reduce 
the risk of collision between the commitment to 
punish and the goal of peaceful settlement. It would 
also tend to emasculate the court at birth and assure 
that in such future cases as it did try to act, it would 
do so subject to the accusation of doing justice 
unequally. During the negotiations at Rome over 
the statute of the International Criminal Court, the 
United States failed in its efforts to secure such a 
limit on the Court’s authority. The statute as ap-
proved by the great majority requires an affi rmative 
vote of the Security Council adopted under Chapter 
VII of the Charter to block the initiation or continu-
ation of an investigation or trial.
***
Despite all the deductive grounds for skepticism I 
sketched at the outset, the reported efforts of Milo-
sevic to conceal his responsibility for atrocities in 
the former Yugoslavia suggest that the risk of crim-
inal responsibility could weigh on the decisions of 
the principals to internal armed confl ict. How much 
it will weigh in the short term will be affected, I 
would guess, by the success of the extant ad hoc 
tribunals for Yugoslavia and Rwanda in trying, 
convicting and punishing severely a number if not a 
majority of the principal organizers respectively of 
war crimes and genocide. In the Yugoslavian case, 
success may require a decision by the United States 
and its allies to demonstrate to the Serbian offi cer 
corps and related civilian elites that they must 
choose between, on the one hand, losing Kosovo 
altogether and also the Serbian rump in Bosnia 
(which would then be divided between Croats and 
Muslims) and remaining a pariah state, or choos-
ing, on the other hand to deliver at least Milosevic 
and his wife and certain paramilitary leaders like 
Arkan to the Tribunal. The will to impose those 
alternatives is not visible, in some measure, per-
haps, because the moral and strategic prudence of 
their imposition is debatable.36 It would, moreover, 
require impunity for most of the offi cer corps. In 
the longer term, the weight of criminal sanctions 
will be a function largely of what one cannot yet 
foresee, namely a robust commitment to deploy 
national criminal justice systems on behalf of inter-
national criminal law.
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to make Serbians feel that they live in an ordinary European country. In such a country, 
Milosevic should appear as an anomalous malignancy requiring excision.
